主  題:在邊際貢獻(xiàn)下降情況下多人的利益分配在管理科學(xué)中的應(yīng)用，兼評管理科學(xué)中的高檔期刊論文發(fā)表問題

內(nèi)容簡介:We use cooperative game theory to investigate multi-player allocation problems under the diminishing marginal contributions (DMC) property. This property describes the law of diminishing returns in the cooperative game setting, i.e., a player's marginal contribution to a non-empty coalition decreases as the size of the coalition increases. For such problems, we develop DMC games, and derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core, which is different from but simpler than the Bondareva-Shapley condition. Then, we obtain an analytic nucleolus solution for DMC games with a non-empty core. This is motivated by the fact that in cooperative game theory, the nucleolus possesses some desirable properties, but the lack of analytic (closed-form) solutions for the concept limits its applications in the analysis of multi-player allocation problems. We also discuss the least core value for the DMC games with an empty core. A code-sharing game, a group-buying game, and a scheduling profit game are studied to illustrate the applications of our analytic results in management science. In addition, we show the applications of our results in cooperative game theory by examining DMC games in some extant classes of coalitional games including linear programming games, bankruptcy games, clan games, matching games, and others. For some of the allocation problems that do not exhibit the DMC property, the formula for the nucleolus solution of DMC games or its modifications can be used to find a unique and stable allocation scheme in the core.

報告人:冷明明      教授    博導(dǎo)

時  間:2018-12-06    16:30

地  點:致明樓誠信廳

舉辦單位:工程管理與審計學(xué)院