主  題:“中庸”悖論

內(nèi)容簡介:運用聲譽信號模型來分析領導的選拔問題。我們考慮一個擁有兩層架構的簡化企業(yè)，企業(yè)中有一個領導和一個管理者。管理者向領導提議有風險的創(chuàng)新項目，并可以選擇進行前期投入來提高此項目的價值。領導決定是否采用此項目。領導的能力為私人信息，市場根據(jù)領導的決策和結(jié)果來更新對領導能力的判斷。在均衡中，領導對名譽的考慮可能引起過度保守。本文有兩個主要結(jié)論：盡管對名譽的考慮會帶來某種扭曲，然而這種考量可能會給企業(yè)帶來好處，原因在于它會激勵管理者努力投入來提高項目價值；其次，市場對于領導能力的預判和企業(yè)績效之間存在一個非單調(diào)的關系。這意味著可能存在中庸的悖論：企業(yè)有可能從任用一個“看上去”中庸的領導中獲益。

We consider a two-agent hierarchical organization with a leader and a manager in a reputation-signaling model. The manager proposes an innovative but risky project to the leader, and decides whether to exert an effort to improve the value of the project, which benets the organization. The leader decides whether to endorse the project or block it. The leader's competence is her private information, and the market updates its belief about the leader's type based on observation of her action (endorsing the project or blocking it) and its outcome. In equilibrium, the leader could behave excessively conservatively when she is subject to reputation concerns. We have two main findings. First, aside from its usual distortionary effects, the leader's reputation concern has a beneficial effect by inducing the manager to supply productive effort and improves the organization's performance. Second, there exists a nonmonotonic relationship between the perceived competence of the leader and the performance of the organization. As a result, a paradox of mediocracy emerges: The organization may benet from a seemingly mediocre leader, as a mediocre leader motivates the manager to exert eort, which osets the eciency loss due to incorrect decisions.

報告人:喬雪      副教授

時  間:2019-03-20    15:30

地  點:位育樓117

舉辦單位:城市發(fā)展研究院  科研部